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Innovative Therapy and the Law: the novel issues raised by the case of Charlie Gard    
Jo Bridgeman, Professor of Healthcare Law and Feminist Ethics, Sussex Law School, 
University of Sussex* 
 
Abstract  
The application by Great Ormond Street Hospital to court in respect of the future medical 
treatment of Charlie Gard was novel in that the Trust sought not only a declaration that it was 
lawful and in Charlie’s best interests to withdraw ventilation but further that it was not in 
Charlie’s best interests to be administered with an innovative therapy which had the effect of 
preventing a doctor in another hospital from administering it to him. It is not uncommon for 
parents to seek for novel, innovative, pioneering, or experimental treatment to be given to a 
seriously ill child although, to date, there have been few cases on this issue before the courts.  
Whilst parents are given a large degree of freedom to raise their children as they consider 
appropriate, limits have to be imposed upon what parents can demand their children are 
subjected to.  All courts, from the Family Division of the High Court through the domestic 
appeal courts to the European Court of Human Rights and back to the Family Division of the 
High Court, affirmed the application of the best interests principle in such cases. In this article 
it is argued that the law should set those limits not merely according to the best interests of 
the individual child but also by whether the therapy is supported by a reasonable and 
competent body of professional opinion and in accordance with good medical practice.  
 
Introduction 
The recent case of Charlie Gard raised questions about the pursuit by parents of innovative, 
novel, pioneering or experimental therapy for a seriously ill child. Whilst his treating clinicians, 
at Great Ormond Street Hospital, considered the therapy to be futile a doctor in the US, 
Professor Hirano, told the court in the first hearing that he was prepared to trial the therapy. 
Convinced that this was a viable alternative therapy, his parents refused to accept the 
judgment of Francis J in the High Court in April 2017 that it was in Charlie’s best interests for 
ventilation to be withdrawn and palliative care provided.  They did not accept that the judge 
was better placed than they, his parents who knew Charlie best, to make decisions about his 
best interests. Whilst the offer of a trial of the therapy remained his parents appealed through 
the courts in the attempt to secure it for him. The facts of the case and the arguments made 
on appeal raise important questions about the legal duties of professionals and of NHS Trusts 
when parents are seeking novel, pioneering, innovative, or experimental therapy to be 
administered to their child. I argue that in such cases the courts should adopt the approach 
taken in the earlier case of Simms also concerned with innovative therapy. In that case, Butler-
Sloss P first considered whether the therapy was supported by a competent body of 
professional opinion, then assessed whether administration of the therapy was in the best 
interests of the patients and finally whether it could be provided by the NHS. This approach, I 
argue, ensures that the medical evidence is clear to all who have the responsibility to 
determine the best interests of a seriously ill child. 
 
This article first outlines the facts of the Charlie Gard case, the novel issues raised and the 
arguments presented on appeal. It then considers, within the context of the arguments made 
before the Court of Appeal, the limits the law places upon the exercise of parental 
responsibility with respect to the medical treatment of a child. The approach adopted to the 
question of the administration of innovative therapy by Butler-Sloss P in Simms1 is explained 
and that approach applied to the facts of the Charlie Gard case. Whilst this approach would 
not have led the judge to a different conclusion, it would have ensured that the court had 
                                                 
 
* I would like to thank the journal editors and referees for their comments and suggestions on an 
earlier draft of this article.  
1  Donald Simms and Jonathan Simms v An NHS Trust and Secretary of State for Health; PA 
and JA v An NHS Trust and Secretary of State for Health [2002] EWHC 2734. 
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before it, and the parents understood, the clinical reasons those responsible for Charlie’s 
medical treatment at GOSH considered it to be ethically wrong, and not in his best interests, 
to maintain Charlie’s life by mechanical ventilation for a trial of the therapy.   
 
The novel issue for the law in the Charlie Gard case 
Charlie Gard appeared to be a normal healthy baby when he was born in August 2016.  At 
eight weeks old, he was admitted to hospital and transferred to the care of Great Ormond 
Street Hospital for Sick Children (GOSH) where he remained on a ventilator and fed by naso-
gastric tube for the rest of his short life. Charlie was diagnosed with an extremely rare, 
inherited, progressive, condition, mitochondrial depletion syndrome, RRM2B.  Mitochondrial 
conditions affect the generation of the energy supply of cells2 in Charlie’s case affecting his 
ability to move, breathe, neurological functioning, and hearing.  
 
His parents, Connie Yates and Chris Gard, wanted him to have a trial of nucleoside bypass 
therapy. This was innovative therapy which had never been administered to a child with the 
form of mitochondrial depletion syndrome which Charlie had nor had it been tried in humans 
or tested on mice.3 There was no prospect of a cure but his parents believed it offered a 
chance of improving the length and quality of his life.4 His clinical team prepared an application 
to the GOSH Rapid Response Clinical Ethics Committee seeking approval for a trial of the 
therapy. In January 2017, before the application could be made, the frequency of Charlie’s 
seizures increased and his clinicians considered he had sustained severe and irreversible 
brain damage. As a consequence, his clinicians concluded that the burdens of everyday living 
outweighed the benefits and that it was not in his interests to be maintained on a ventilator, 
with associated pain and suffering, for the administration of therapy which was of uncertain 
benefit. Second opinions from ‘world leading authorities’ supported their conclusion that 
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment was reasonable and in accordance with Royal College 
of Paediatrician and Child Health (RCPCH) guidelines.5  His parents rejected his doctors’ 
assessment of the severity of his brain damage, refused their consent to the withdrawal of 
ventilation and maintained the view that he should be given the chance of benefitting from 
nucleoside therapy. Commencing the lengthy legal battle, GOSH applied to court for a 
declaration under its inherent jurisdiction and a Specific Issue Order under s.8 of the Children 
Act 1989 that it was lawful, and in Charlie’s best interests, not to be given nucleoside therapy 
and that it was lawful to withdraw ventilation and provide palliative care.  
 
Judges are regularly asked by Trusts to decide whether it is lawful, and in the best interests 
of a child, for life-sustaining treatment to be withdrawn or withheld.6  The novel question for 
                                                 
2  Department of Health, Mitochondrial Donation: A consultation on draft regulations to permit the 
use of new treatment techniques to prevent the transmission of a serious mitochondrial disease 
from mother to child, February 2014, 1.4.  
3  Francis J explained that as a consequence he viewed the therapy to be experimental rather 
than pioneering, GOSH v Yates & Gard [2017] EWHC 972, [49]. I have used the terminology 
of innovative therapy following Brierley and Larcher who defined innovative therapy as ‘any 
newly introduced treatment, or a new modification to an existing therapy with unproven efficacy 
and side effect profile, which is being used in the best interests of a patient, often on an 
experimental and/or compassionate basis,’ Joe Brierley and Vic Larcher, ‘Compassionate and 
innovative treatments in children: a proposal for an ethical framework’ (2009) 94 Arch Dis Child 
651-654, http://nnpdf.org/files/2016/11/Compassionate-Use-in-Children.pdf [last accessed 
26/9/17].  
4  GOSH v Yates & Gard [2017] EWHC 972, [107-112]. 
5  Ibid, [60] referring to the RCPCH framework for good medical practice, Making decisions to limit 
treatment in life-limiting and life-threatening conditions in children: a framework for practice, 
2015, (2015) Archives of Diseases in Childhood 1-23, doi: 10.1136/archdischild-2014-306666 
[last accessed 27/9/17].  
6  In the months when questions about Charlie’s future medical treatment were before the courts, 
April-July 2017, there were three such cases decided by the High Court and reported on Bailii; 
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the court on Charlie’s future medical treatment was whether it was lawful, and in Charlie’s best 
interests, for him not to be administered with innovative therapy. The declarations the court 
was asked to make were thus unprecedented in that they not only addressed the legality of 
the care plan the GOSH clinicians considered to be in Charlie’s best interests, to which his 
parents could not agree, but further had the effect of preventing the administration of 
innovative therapy by a clinician in another hospital who was offering to provide it.  
 
At the first hearing, in April 2017, Counsel for Charlie’s parents, Sophia Roper, with reference 
to Simms (considered below),7 pointed to the novel issues raised by the dispute between his 
parents and clinicians in that there were no previous ‘cases where life-sustaining treatment 
has been withdrawn, even from a profoundly disabled child with a desperately poor quality of 
life, where there is an available treatment which has the potential materially to improve that 
quality of life’.8 Francis J first assessed the evidence upon Charlie’s quality of life and then the 
chances of the therapy improving his quality of life. The evidence at the first hearing of the 
case in April led Francis J to the conclusion that Charlie’s ‘quality of life was not one that 
should be sustained without hope of improvement’ and that the consensus of the doctors who 
had examined Charlie was that nucleoside therapy was ‘futile’.9 The judge made the 
declarations sought by the Trust having concluded that it was not in Charlie’s best interests to 
undergo a trial of the therapy or for ventilation to be continued, a view shared by the Guardian 
who was appointed by the court to provide independent representation of Charlie’s interests.  
 
In the Court of Appeal Counsel for Charlie’s parents, Richard Gordon QC, adopted a different 
approach to this novel question.10 Drawing upon the case of King (considered below),11 the 
submission was that where there is an alternative viable therapeutic option to that proposed 
by the treating clinicians, parental preference should be followed except in those cases where 
it is likely to cause the child ‘significant harm’.12   In reply Katie Gollop QC for GOSH submitted 
that the ‘established yardstick’ was best interests and there was no ‘justification for this court 
to endorse the creation of a sub-set of cases based upon establishing significant harm’.13  In 
his leading judgment, rejecting the submission, McFarlane LJ concluded that the authorities 
demonstrated that there is no ‘factor or filter’ before the court evaluates the best interests of 
the child.14 Furthermore, that as the judge had found that administration of nucleoside therapy 
would be futile, be of no benefit and merely prolong, in McFarlane LJ’s words, Charlie’s ‘awful 
existence’,15 there was no viable alternative before the court.16 Finally, although it had not 
been addressed in the court below, McFarlane LJ considered that had Francis J been invited 
to find whether Charlie was currently suffering significant harm he would have so concluded17 
and, it followed, significant harm would result from the continuation of ventilation and Charlie’s 
                                                 
A Local Authority and An NHS Trust v MC & FC & C [2017] EWHC 370; GOSH v NO & KK & 
MK [2017] EWHC 241; An NHS Hospital Trust v GM, DK and HK [2017] EWHC 1710. An NHS 
Trust v BK, LK & SK [2016] EWHC 2860 was decided in November 2016 but publication of the 
judgment of MacDonald J was delayed until April 2017 to avoid having to ask the child’s parents 
whether the judgment should be published immediately following the death of their son. 
7  Supra, n 1. 
8  Supra, n 4, [124]. 
9  Ibid, [126]. 
10  In the first hearing before the High Court, Charlie’s parents were represented by Sophia Roper 
instructed by Bindmans LLP; before the Court of Appeal they were represented by Richard 
Gordon QC, Gerard Rothschild and Grant Armstrong instructed by Harris Da Silva.  
11  In the Matter of Ashya King [2014] EWHC 2964. 
12  In the Matter of Charles Gard [2017] EWCA Civ 410, [58]. 
13  Ibid, [74]. 
14  Ibid, [94]. 
15  Ibid, [97]. 
16  Ibid, [97]. 
17  Ibid, [114]. 
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life in order to administer nucleoside therapy.18 Thus, the court found that the submissions 
could not be supported as a matter of fact rendering irrelevant the question of a distinction in 
law.  The second ground of appeal, also dismissed, was that GOSH had no standing to prevent 
the US team from administering the therapy, to seek to do so was beyond the powers of the 
hospital as a public authority and in the absence of significant harm outside the court’s 
jurisdiction.19 The submission was that whilst the Trust could apply to court and the court could 
make a declaration that it was lawful for the Trust’s clinicians not to provide nucleoside 
therapy, the Trust could not seek to prevent the parents seeking the treatment elsewhere. The 
Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal preferring the submission of Ms Gollop QC that the 
issue had arisen between the parents and the clinicians which the Trust had properly brought 
before the court for a judge to decide according to the best interests of the child.20 The 
Supreme Court rejected the parents’ application for permission to appeal determining that it 
did not raise an arguable point of law.21  The European Court of Human Rights deemed the 
parents’ application inadmissible.22  English law did not breach the Article 2, 5, 6 or 8 rights of 
Charlie’s parents. The courts thus affirmed the approach which has been developed at 
common law primarily through decisions of courts of first instance. The appeal process was 
thus exhausted but in July 2017, at the request of Charlie’s parents, GOSH returned to the 
High Court for evaluation of what his parents hoped amounted to new medical evidence. But, 
after further tests which revealed the extent of Charlie’s muscle deterioration, Charlie’s parents 
accepted that the therapy no longer offered him a chance of any improvement and withdrew 
their opposition to the orders.23 Francis J made declarations about Charlie’s end of life care 
upon which his parents and GOSH were unable to agree. Charlie was moved to a hospice, 
ventilation withdrawn, and he died, minutes later, a week before his first birthday. 
 
The Limits of Parental Responsibility  
Charlie’s parents expressed the view that their parental rights had been removed from them 
by the actions of GOSH and then the decisions of the court which had the effect of preventing 
them from taking Charlie to America for innovative therapy. The GOSH position statement in 
July submitted that:  
 
‘Charlie’s parents fundamentally believe that they alone have the right to decide what 
treatment Charlie has and does not have. They do not believe that Great Ormond 
Street should have had the right to apply to the Court for an independent, objective 
decision to be made. They do not believe that there is any role for a judge or a court. 
They believe that only they can and should speak for Charlie and they have said many 
times that they feel they have been stripped of their rights as parents’.24  
 
Whilst Charlie’s parents deployed the discourse of parental rights rather than responsibilities, 
their claim was one which reflects the position in law, which is that the primary responsibility 
for children rests with their parents rather than the state.  Parents do have legal obligations, 
for example, to ensure the child receives an appropriate education25 and to seek medical 
                                                 
18  Ibid, [115]. 
19  Ibid, [84]. 
20  Ibid, [88], [117]. 
21  In the matter of Charlie Gard (Permission to Appeal Hearing), 8 June 2017, 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/news/permission-to-appeal-hearing-in-the-matter-of-charlie-
gard.html [last accessed 27/9/17]. 
22  Charles Gard and Others v United Kingdom. Application no. 39793/it 17, 28 June 2017, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"documentcollectionid2":["DECGRANDCHAMBER","ADMISSIB
ILITY","ADMISSIBILITYCOM"],"itemid":["001-175359"]} [last accessed 27/9/17]. 
23  Re Gard (A Child) [2017] EWHC 1909. 
24  GOSH’s position statement of the 13th July, [7], https://www.serjeantsinn.com/news/charlie-
gard-position-statements/ [last accessed 27/9/17]. 
25  Education Act 1996, ss.7-8. 
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treatment for a sick child.26 Yet, the law gives parents ‘a large measure of autonomy in the 
way in which they discharge their parental responsibilities’27 from routine day-to-day matters 
to important decisions which will have major consequences for the child’s life. This is why the 
Children Act 1989 imposes a threshold before the court can consider whether it is in the 
welfare of the child for public law care orders to be made. The threshold, set out in section 
31(2), is that the child is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm attributable to ‘(i) the 
care given to the child, or likely to be given to him if the order were not made, not being what 
it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him; or (ii) the child’s being beyond parental 
control.’ So whilst the primary responsibility for the care of children rests with their parents and 
parents have a large degree of freedom as to how they raise their children, limits are placed 
upon parental discharge of their responsibilities in the interests of child protection and welfare.   
 
Decisions about a child’s medical treatment are made in the exercise of parental responsibility 
held in Charlie’s case by his mother and father. Parental responsibility is defined in section 
s.3(1) of the Children Act as ‘all the rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which 
by law a parent of a child has in relation to the child and his property.’28 In the context of a 
child’s medical treatment, this has been framed as a parental right which is subject to the 
welfare of the child. Holders of parental responsibility are required to ‘adopt a child centred 
approach to their responsibilities in meeting the child’s welfare’.29 As Ward LJ said in the 
conjoined twins case, Re A, ‘Since the parents have the right in the exercise of their parental 
responsibility to make the decision, it should not be a surprise that their wishes should 
command very great respect. Parental right is, however, subordinate to welfare.’30 In the 
majority of cases, parents will work together with the clinicians responsible for their child’s 
care, together agreeing upon the treatment, from the options available, that they consider to 
be in the best interests of the child, altering the treatment plan in response to the specific 
needs of the individual child. Where parents and clinicians cannot agree upon a treatment 
plan, the welfare of the child requires the Trust to refer the dispute to court. The responsibility 
is then that of the judge to make an independent, objective, decision on the evidence as to the 
child’s best interests.  
 
Before the Court of Appeal, Counsel for Charlie’s parents submitted that in the context of the 
agreed preferences of holders of parental responsibility as to the medical treatment that was 
in the best interests of their child the limit placed upon the exercise of parental responsibility 
was that of a risk of significant harm.  In making this submission Mr Gordon QC was not 
seeking to bracket the case with public law care proceedings but to align it, as an exception 
in the body of case law over the past forty years, with the case of King. The submission was 
grounded in the words of Baker J in that case when he said,    
 
‘In most cases, the parents are the best people to make decisions about a child and 
the State – whether it be the court, or any other public authority – has no business 
interfering with the exercise of parental responsibility unless the child is suffering or is 
likely to suffer significant harm as a result of the care given to the child not being what 
it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give.’31   
   
On the facts of the case before him, Baker J concluded that the state had rightly interfered 
with the exercise of parental responsibility when Ashya had been removed by his parents from 
specialist care at a time when he urgently needed post-operative treatment. At that time, the 
                                                 
26  Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s.1. 
27  Regina v Secretary of State for Education and Employment and Others [2005] UKHL 15, [72]. 
28  It was accepted in In Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court's Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam 64, 
78, that decisions about a child’s medical treatment come within parental responsibility.   
29  Re C (children) [2016] EWCA Civ 374, King LJ [43], quoting Sharpe J in the Family Court. 
30  In Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam 147, 193. 
31  Supra, n 11, [31]. 
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hospital and local authority believed that his parents did not have the supply of food or energy 
required for the administration of his naso-gastric feed nor the skills to ensure its safe 
provision. Consequently, the local authority had applied for Ashya to be made a ward of court 
given reasonable grounds to believe that Ashya was at risk of suffering significant harm. The 
treatment Ashya’s parents thought was best for him, Proton Beam Therapy following surgery 
to remove a malignant brain tumour, was innovative and unproven in children with Ashya’s 
condition. The doctors at Southampton did not consider Proton Beam Therapy to be a worse 
option than conventional treatment but neither did they think it offered any benefits over 
conventional radiotherapy. At the time Proton Beam Therapy was not available in the UK and 
funding for treatment abroad had been refused in accordance with NHS England guidance.32 
By the time the matter was before Baker J in wardship proceedings, the judge was able to 
conclude that there was a reasonable and coherent alternative treatment plan for the provision 
of the post-operative care with funding and transport arrangements in place not opposed by 
the local authority, CAFCASS or the Trust.33  Baker J gave permission for Ashya to be taken 
to Prague for the treatment and ordered that wardship be discharged upon his admission.  
 
Having analysed Baker J’s judgment in King, McFarlane LJ concluded that it provided no basis 
for holding that ‘any test based on significant harm is to be applied to cases relating to the 
medical treatment of children’.34 This view was upheld by the Supreme Court.  The legal 
principle for decisions about a child’s medical treatment was best interests and not the 
absence of significant harm. Yet, Charlie’s parents continued to believe that it was in their 
son’s best interests to try innovative therapy which a doctor in the US was willing to administer.   
 
Innovative Therapy  
To date, there are few reported cases concerning the provision of innovative therapy to 
children.  The first, in 1995, concerned an application by the father of Jaymee Bowen for 
judicial review of the Health Authority’s decision not to fund an extra-contractual referral for 
further treatment against leukaemia. Jaymee had relapsed after a period in remission following 
treatment for acute myeloid leukaemia as a secondary cancer following treatment for non-
Hodgkin’s lymphoma.35 Jaymee’s doctors had concluded that it was not in Jaymee’s best 
interests to be given the treatment, donor lymphocyte infusion, described in the judgment as 
at the ‘frontier of medical science’.36 Her doctors thought that it was in her best interests to be 
given palliative care, minimising pain and suffering with the aim of enabling her to enjoy what 
remained of her life. As a judicial review of a funding decision, the court neither addressed 
whether the treatment was supported by a competent body of professional opinion nor whether 
it was in Jaymee’s best interests to have further treatment or palliative care.  Following media 
publicity of the unsuccessful challenge to the decision in the courts, Jaymee’s treatment was 
funded by an anonymous donor. Jaymee went into remission but died just over a year after 
the treatment commenced.  
 
A better comparison than either King, in which the medical issue had been resolved, or Bowen, 
as judicial review of the health authority’s funding decision, is the case of Simms. Whilst 
unusual in the jurisprudence in that the application for a declaration of the court in the exercise 
of its inherent jurisdiction was made by the parents, that is of no distinction as once the matter 
is referred to court, by a party with an interest in the child’s welfare, the duty of the judge is to 
decide it.  The court was asked to approve the administration of unlicensed therapy to two 
teenagers, one eighteen and one sixteen years old, both of whom had been rendered 
                                                 
32  Ibid, [9-10]. 
33  Ibid, [33]. 
34  Supra, n 12, [104]. 
35  R v Cambridge District Health Authority, ex parte B [1995] 1 FLR 1055. The case is critiqued 
by Chris Ham & Susan Pickard, Tragic Choices in Health Care: The case of Child B, King’s 
Fund, 1998 and detailed in Sarah Barclay, Jaymee; The Story of Child B, 1996. 
36  Ibid. 
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incompetent, entirely dependent and ‘helpless invalids lying in a bed and with a severely 
limited enjoyment of life’ by probable variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD). Told there 
was no cure for vCJD the father of the eighteen year-old, later identified as Jonathan Simms, 
found on the internet details of Japanese research into the therapy. In his evidence to the 
court, he explained that if the case went against them they would ‘search the world to get 
treatment elsewhere, including going to have the treatment in Japan’.37 Butler-Sloss P was 
asked to approve the unlicensed therapy, described at various points in the judgment as 
‘innovative’, ‘experimental’, ‘pioneering’, in which PPS (Pentosan Polysulphate) infusions 
would be administered, following a surgical procedure, directly into the brain. Research had 
been carried out in different species and it was not known whether it would work in humans or 
on vCJD.38 The risks and benefits of the therapy to the teenagers both of whom had severe 
brain damage, yet were considered to experience both pleasure and pain, was unknown.39 
Butler-Sloss P followed the approach she had adopted in In re A (Male Sterilisation),40 a case 
concerned with the sterilisation of an incompetent adult in which the she first identified the 
viable options accepted as proper by a competent body of professional opinion before 
determining which of the viable options was in the best interests of the patient. Thus, the judge 
first asked whether there was a competent body of professional opinion within the United 
Kingdom which supported the therapy, subject to the risks and benefits of the therapy, before 
considering whether it was in the best interests of the teenagers to receive it.41  
 
As John Harrington has observed,42 Butler-Sloss P applied a ‘fairly weak’ version of the 
Bolam43 test based on the absence of negative opinions. The judge said that the Bolam test 
should not operate so as to ‘inhibit medical progress’ observing that if Bolam had to be 
‘complied with to its fullest extent’ then no innovative treatment or procedures could be tried.44 
Having considered the three medical English experts and the research of the Japanese 
neuropathologist, the judge was ‘satisfied, consistent with the philosophy that underpins the 
Bolam test [1957] 1 WLR 582, that there is a responsible body of relevant professional opinion 
which supports this innovative treatment.’45  Butler-Sloss P then assessed the risks and 
benefits to determine whether the responsible body of opinion was ‘capable of withstanding 
logical analysis’.46 There were risks from the surgery, general anaesthetic and the infusion. 
Butler-Sloss P considered the benefits to be harder to assess. However, the judge explained 
that she considered benefit to a patient who will not recover to include improvement from their 
current condition, continuation in their current condition without deterioration for longer than 
may have been the case, and prolongation of life for longer than might otherwise have been.47 
In the judge’s view,     
 
‘Where there is no alternative treatment available and the disease is progressive and 
fatal, it seems to me to be reasonable to consider experimental treatment with 
unknown benefits and risks, but without significant risks of increased suffering to the 
patient, in cases where there is some chance of benefit to the patient.’48  
                                                 
37  Supra, n 1, [5]. 
38  Ibid, [22]. 
39  Ibid, [4], [7]. 
40  In re A (Male Sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549. 
41  Supra, n 1, [51]. 
42  John Harrington, ‘Deciding Best Interests: Medical Progress, Clinical Judgment and the “Good 
Family” [2003] 3 Web JCLI. 
43  Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
44  Supra, n 1, [48]. 
45  Ibid, [51]. 
46  Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232. 
47  Supra, n 1, [57]. 
48  Ibid, [57]. This paragraph is quoted by the Department of Health, Reference Guide to Consent 
for Examination or Treatment, 2009, ch.1, para.41. The issue is not addressed in GMC, 0-18 




Having concluded that the therapy was supported by a reasonable body of professional 
opinion capable of withstanding logical analysis, the next question was whether it was in the 
best interests of the teenagers. Butler-Sloss P stressed that best interests had to be assessed 
in the ‘widest possible way’,49 ‘to include the medical and non-medical benefits and 
disadvantages, the broader welfare issues of the two patients, their abilities, their future with 
or without treatment, the views of the families, and the impact of refusal of the applications.’50 
Whilst there were risks involved in the therapy and its administration, a ‘slightly longer life’ 
within their ‘devoted and wonderfully caring famil[ies]’ was a benefit worth having.51 Butler-
Sloss P gave the views of the parents and the ‘effect upon them of refusal great weight in the 
wider considerations of the best interests test’ recognising the ‘agony’ they had gone through 
in witnessing the deterioration of their children and their deep commitment to the therapy.52  
Butler-Sloss P emphasised that the parents understood the risks, were aware of the 
uncertainty of benefit and would not prolong life if their child was suffering. The balance of 
research and expert evidence before the court supported the conclusion that the therapy 
should be tried, a conclusion shared by the Official Solicitor.  
 
In an Appendix added to the judgment on the day it was published, Butler-Sloss P explained 
that although the court had declared the treatment lawful and the consultant neurosurgeon in 
responsible for the teenagers was prepared to try it, the Trust’s Clinical Governance and 
Quality Committee refused to approve the provision of the treatment at the hospital and the 
chair of the Drugs and Therapeutic Panel had indicated it would not approve the administration 
of the drug.53  The consequence, Butler-Sloss P said, was that the proceedings had been an 
‘unacceptable academic exercise’ which was a ‘cruel blow’ for the families. Acknowledging 
that the application to court had been made by the parents, the judge expressed the hope that 
in future cases a Trust would ‘form its own conclusions’ about the administration of therapy 
before the matter was referred to court.54 However, as the judge had requested in her 
judgment, the Department of Health assisted the families by investigating other possibilities 
for the provision of the therapy.55 A hospital in Northern Ireland was prepared to provide the 
therapy, which it did after approval from the Northern Ireland High Court.56  
 
To illustrate the argument that Simms provides a better framework for decisions about the 
provision of innovative therapy to children, than one based upon best interests alone, I now 
address each of the questions posed in Simms applying them to the facts in Charlie’s case.  
  
Did Charlie have the capacity to make decisions about his medical treatment? 
It was agreed that Charlie, six months old at the time of the application, lacked the capacity to 
make decisions about his medical treatment. His parents had been making decisions, from 
the treatment options presented to them by his clinicians, in the exercise of parental 
responsibility. Whilst they retained their parental responsibility, once the application was 
before the court it was the responsibility of the judge, Francis J, to decide upon the specific 
issues in the application.   
 
                                                 
49  Ibid, [60]. 
50  Ibid, [60]. 
51  Ibid, [61]. 
52  Ibid, [64]. 
53  Ibid, [74].  
54  Ibid, [70]. 
55  Ibid, [74]. 
56  Owen Dyer, ‘Family finds hospital willing to give experimental CJD treatment’ (2003) 326 BMJ 
8.  At the time average life expectancy from initial onset of symptoms was 14 months,  Donald 
Simms and Jonathan Simms v An NHS Trust and Secretary of State for Health; PA and JA v 
An NHS Trust and Secretary of State for Health [2002] EWHC 2734, [9] Jonathan Simms lived 
another ten years. 
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Was there a responsible body of medical opinion which would support the treatment?  
The evidence before the High Court in April was that nucleoside bypass therapy had not been 
given to anyone with Charlie’s condition, RRM2B, nor tested upon mice with this mutation. It 
had been used with patients with a less severe mitochondrial condition, the TK2 mutation. A 
key difference between the two conditions was that to be beneficial with RRM2B the drugs 
would have to cross the blood/brain barrier enabling it to work on the brain in the same way 
as the rest of the body,57 of which there was ‘theoretical and anecdotal’, but no direct, 
evidence.58 One competent body of professional opinion held by the clinicians at GOSH, 
supported by second opinions, was that given that Charlie had suffered severe brain damage 
trial of the therapy was not a proper course of medical treatment.  As Francis J observed 
Professor Hirano, one of the experts in a highly specialised field, was a ‘lone voice’ in his 
willingness to try the therapy.59 The court did not have evidence before it of a responsible body 
of medical opinion prepared to try the therapy. 
 
It was agreed that the administration of the therapy itself, a powder mixed into food, presented 
little risk. The prospect of benefit was, Francis J concluded from the evidence before him, ‘as 
close to zero as makes no difference’, in other words, he said, it would be ‘futile’.60 At the April 
hearing, Professor Hirano agreed with Charlie’s treating clinicians that the therapy was 
‘unlikely’ to ‘help Charlie’s severe neurological disease’61 but was prepared to try as it was the 
only option and without it Charlie’s condition was fatal.62 In his April judgment, Francis J noted 
that although Professor Hirano had been given access to Charlie’s medical records and had 
seen the latest EEG he had not examined Charlie.63  Professor Hirano’s lack of direct 
knowledge of Charlie’s current condition was evident in his response to the question whether 
he was aware that the Trust’s primary application was with respect to the withdrawal of 
ventilation. He said, ‘Perhaps, if I were there, I would support it. Not seeing the child, not 
seeing progression, it’s difficult for me to make an assessment’.64 As Counsel for Charlie’s 
Guardian, Victoria Butler-Cole, stated:  
 
‘If novel therapies are to be offered, it appears to the Guardian to be imperative that 
those offering to provide them are fully aware of the clinical condition and medical 
history of the particular patient and have had extensive discussion with the treating 
team, so that offers are made on an informed basis and without setting up false hopes 
and expectations.’65  
 
As Francis J explained in his July judgment, the court could not rely upon the evidence of a 
doctor from another hospital who had not examined Charlie, his medical records, or the 
second opinions obtained by GOSH.66 An opinion formed without such examination could not 
withstand logical analysis. The evidence before the court in April amounted to a ‘theoretical’ 
possibility that the therapy could be of benefit for which there was no clinical evidence.67 Unlike 
in Simms there was no competent body of professional opinion before the court prepared to 
try the therapy. Yet, the US doctor’s continued willingness to try the therapy kept alive the 
hopes of Charlie’s parents that there was a chance of an improvement to his quality of life, if 
only Professor Hirano were allowed to try it. 
                                                 
57  Supra, n 4, [73]. 
58  Ibid, [76], [101]. 
59  Ibid, [16]. 
60  Ibid, [119]. 
61  Ibid, [75]. 
62  Ibid, [127]. 
63  Ibid, [94], [98]. 
64  Ibid,, [99]. 
65  Guardian position statement, 24 July 2017, [7]  https://www.serjeantsinn.com/news/charlie-
gard-position-statements/ [last accessed 27/9/17]. 
66  Supra, n 23, [12]. 




In July Counsel for Charlie’s parents, Grant Armstrong, submitted that they had new evidence 
about the therapy which meant there was a competent body of professional opinion which 
supported its provision. At the invitation of Francis J, Professor Hirano agreed to come to 
London to examine Charlie and discuss his condition and any viable therapy with the GOSH 
clinicians.  At this multidisciplinary meeting it was agreed that Charlie would undergo further 
tests. An MRI body scan revealed the extent of muscle deterioration which led Charlie’s 
parents, in consultation with Professor Hirano, to the conclusion that the therapy ‘no longer 
offers a chance of a meaningful recovery to Charlie’.68  Having examined Charlie, his medical 
records and discussed the latest test results all experts were in agreement with the 
conclusions of his clinicians at GOSH. Throughout the proceedings there had been no 
competent and reasonable body of professional opinion in the UK, Europe or the world, which 
supported the trial of the therapy.  The absence of a competent body of medical opinion 
considering the therapy to be proper medical treatment would, following the approach in 
Simms, have led to the declarations sought by GOSH being made. Thus, on the facts of the 
case, adopting the approach applied in Simms would not have led to a different outcome. To 
have addressed directly the question whether the therapy was supported by a competent and 
reasonable body of professional opinion would have identified, at an earlier stage in the 
proceedings, the absence of the medical evidence the court required before it could agree to 
the innovative therapy.            
 
Was it is Charlie’s best interests to have the therapy?   
For Charlie’s clinicians at GOSH, having concluded that trial of the therapy was not one they 
could in their professional judgment administer to Charlie, the question was whether it was in 
his best interests to be kept alive on ventilation. Patients who have been mechanically 
ventilated and recovered have told of the pain and suffering it caused them. Charlie’s clinicians 
believed he had a conscious experience of pain which he was unable to express.69 Their 
professional conclusion was that Charlie’s ‘current quality of life is not one that should be 
sustained without hope of improvement’ and therefore he should not be subjected to more 
pain and suffering for the administration of ‘futile’ therapy.70 However, had there been evidence 
before the court of a body of ‘responsible medical opinion’ which did not ‘reject the research’71 
there would then have been two viable options supported by competent professional opinion. 
The next question would have been which of these two alternatives, withdrawal of active 
treatment and the provision of palliative care to ensure a dignified and peaceful death or the 
continuation of ventilation and trial of innovative therapy, was in Charlie’s best interests.    
 
Charlie’s parents assessment of what was best for their son was based not only upon the 
hope maintained by the offer from the US doctor to administer the therapy but upon their 
experience and knowledge of their son as an individual gained through the hours they had 
spent with him at his bedside each day over the months he had been hospitalised.  As 
Alderson et al noted, from their observations of premature babies in a neonatal intensive care 
unit, whilst unable to express themselves in words, babies ‘”speak” in an expressive language 
of sounds, facial expressions and body movements that can be “read”’ by parents concerned 
to represent their child’s views. Those caring for the babies described their unique characters 
and personalities as individuals enabling an assessment of best interests which is personal, 
particularistic and relational. Both parents and professionals reflected upon babies who had 
                                                 
68  Position statement on behalf of the parents, 24 & 25 July, [19], 
https://www.serjeantsinn.com/news/charlie-gard-position-statements/ [last accessed 27/9/17]. 
69  Supra, n 4, [16]. 
70  Ibid, [113-4]. 
71  Supra, n 1, [48]. 
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fought for their life and those who appeared to have had enough.72 Charlie’s parents did not 
accept his clinician’s assessment of the extent of his brain damage believing that he 
responded to them, and was able to express pleasure and his dislikes.73 They were driven by 
the view that he was fighting for his life and whilst he was still fighting they would fight for him.     
 
Where parental decisions about their child’s well-being made in the exercise of their parental 
responsibility are challenged before the courts best interests needs to be assessed, as Butler-
Sloss P stated, in the ‘widest possible way’.74 This requires a focus upon the individual child 
with a ‘body, mind and spirit expressed in a human personality of unique worth who is 
profoundly precious to her parents’75 to which parental evidence is particularly relevant. 
Parents, like professionals, have specific expertise as to the best interests of a child which 
must be considered by a judge to fulfil the responsibility to reach an independent, objective, 
decision as to child welfare. The reasoning which the parents sought to employ in the exercise 
of their parental responsibility should be brought into the assessment of best interests at the 
same time ensuring that the decision is focused upon the interests of the child who is known 
best by those who care for him or her. The court will assess the parental evidence in the same 
way as it assesses the medical evidence. As Butler-Sloss LJ explained in Re T the duty of the 
court is to undertake an independent assessment of the welfare of the child in the context of 
all the relevant facts including the view of the child’s parents - depending upon the court’s 
assessment of those views.76  Decisions have to be made about what is best for the child that 
all with responsibility for the child, parents, healthcare practitioners and judge, can live with.   
 
When they believed that there was a viable alternative treatment offered by a specialist which 
gave their son a chance of a better quality of life, Charlie’s parents understandably concluded 
it was best for him to try it. Other parents faced with this decision could equally have concluded 
that palliative care was in the best interests of their child. Agonising as Francis J recognised it 
was, following discussions with Professor Hirano in light of the results of the MRI test in July, 
Charlie’s parents accepted that the therapy offered no chance of a better quality of life for 
Charlie and reluctantly agreed that the only course was the provision of palliative care.77 
Throughout, Charlie’s parents were acting upon what they genuinely believed from their 
understanding of the evidence to be best for their son.     
             
Was the therapy capable of being carried out within the NHS? 
The GOSH clinicians had initially been prepared to try nucleoside therapy. They had in the 
past administered nucleoside therapy to children with other mitochondrial conditions so there 
were no issues of expertise, facilities, or special equipment. In comparison with the King case, 
where the treatment his parents wanted him to receive was not available in the UK,78 the 
therapy could have been administered at GOSH with Charlie remaining on ventilation in 
intensive care whilst his progress was monitored. Neither, as Francis J observed in his April 
judgment was funding an issue, as it had been for the extra-contractual referral in the case of 
Jaymee Bowen or Ashya King’s treatment abroad.79    
 
                                                 
72  Priscilla Alderson, Joanna Hawthorne and Margaret Killen, ‘The Participation Rights of 
Premature Babies’, in Michael Freeman (ed), Children’s Health and Children’s Rights, Martin 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2006, 31-50, 34. 
73  Supra, n 4, [107-112]. 
74  Supra, n 1, [60]. 
75  Portsmouth NHS Trust v Wyatt [2004] EWHC 2247, [39]. 
76  Re T (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1997] 1 WLR 242, 250. 
77  Supra, n 23, [1]. 
78  Proton Beam Therapy Centres are under construction; one at The Christie NHS Foundation 
Trust Manchester is expected to open in 2018 and one at  University College London Hospital 
NHS Foundation Trust in 2020,  https://www.england.nhs.uk/commissioning/spec-
services/highly-spec-services/pbt/ [last accessed 27/9/17].  
79  Supra, n 4, [80].  
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From April when Francis J made the declarations until the end of July when Charlie’s parents 
accepted the evidence that palliative care was the only option, although the hospital had a 
court order which stated that it was lawful to withdraw ventilation and provide palliative care, 
Charlie remained on ventilation.  In June, Lady Hale in the Supreme Court observed that, as 
a consequence of the stay of the declarations, it had been lawful for doctors to continue to 
ventilate Charlie. Ethically, however, the Justice observed, his doctors considered it wrong to 
have continued to do so contrary to their professional judgement that it was not in his best 
interests.80 At the same time, his clinicians remained open to new evidence which would have 
enabled them to alter their professional judgement. 
 
Had there been a different, competent, body of professional opinion which supported provision 
of the therapy and the judge been of the opinion that it was in Charlie’s best interests to receive 
it, it is a well-established principle that neither the court nor parents can require doctors to treat 
contrary to their professional judgement.  This was first stated by Lord Donaldson MR in the 
Court of Appeal in one of the first cases in which the withholding of life-sustaining treatment 
was before the court for consideration, Re J (1990),81 repeated as part of his ratio in the case 
in Re J (1992),   
 
‘The fundamental issue in this appeal is whether the court … should ever require a 
medical practitioner … to adopt a course of treatment which in the bona ﬁde clinical 
judgment of the practitioner concerned is contra-indicated as not being in the best 
interests of the patient. I have to say that I cannot at present conceive of any 
circumstances in which this would be other than an abuse of power as directly or 
indirectly requiring the practitioner to act contrary to the fundamental duty which he 
owes to his patient. This, subject to obtaining any necessary consent, is to treat the 
patient in accordance with his own best clinical judgment, notwithstanding that other 
practitioners who are not called upon to treat the patient may have formed a quite 
different judgment or that the court, acting on expert evidence, may disagree with 
him.’82  
 
Lord Donaldson MR said in Re J that parents cannot insist on treatment and doctors can 
refuse to administer treatment which they consider to be medically contra-indicated or which 
they cannot conscientiously administer.83   
 
Hedley J gave further consideration to professional conscience in his fourth judgment in the 
case of Charlotte Wyatt. A year after the initial application by the Trust and in light of evidence 
of improvement in her condition, Charlotte’s parents applied for a discharge of the declaration 
which authorised withholding of ventilation in the event of a respiratory attack, whilst the Trust 
made a ‘novel’ application for authority, in the event of an irreconcilable disagreement about 
her treatment, for decisions to be made by her doctors.84 The relationship between her parents 
and the hospital had become volatile and acrimonious; her parents had made complaints to 
the police about Charlotte’s care and were only permitted to visit her accompanied by 
security.85 Hedley J discharged the declaration which had the effect of returning responsibility 
to consent to the provision or withholding of ventilation to Charlotte’s parents. In these 
circumstances, Hedley J was concerned to explain clearly the nature and limits of the 
                                                 
80  Supreme Court, Judgment of the UK Supreme Court in the Case of Charlie Gard, 19 June 
2017, https://www.supremecourt.uk/news/latest-judgment-in-the-matter-of-charlie-gard.html  
[last accessed 27/9/17]; 
81  Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam 33. 
82  Re J (A Minor) (Child in Care: Medical Treatment) [1992] 3 WLR 507, 516 and again in Re R 
(A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] 4 All ER 177. 
83  Supra, n 81, 40.  
84  Re Wyatt [2005] EWHC 2293, [14]. 
85  Ibid, [17-26]. 
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professional duties doctors owe to their child patient. Hedley J stressed that where the patient 
lacks competence the doctor’s duty is to act in the patient’s best interests and to work in 
partnership with the child’s parents,86 accommodating parental wishes where to do so is not 
an ‘affront to the clinician’s conscience’.87  But that, following Re J (1992), professionals cannot 
be required to act contrary to their professional conscience. This, Hedley J explained, was an 
‘intellectual’ process in which the doctor must take account of all the circumstances, 
professional guidance and second opinions, to conclude what is in the patient’s best 
interests.88   Professional conscience is more intuitive than rational and ‘honed by experience 
of patients, exposure to the practice of colleagues, and the ethos of his work’.89  For the GOSH 
clinicians, given the deterioration in Charlie’s condition, having followed the RCPCH 
Guidelines and secured second opinions from within the UK and Europe, administration of 
nucleoside therapy was not in accordance with a competent body of professional opinion and 
it would have been an affront to professional conscience to administer it to him. Where they 
reach this conclusion, clinicians have a duty to seek other doctors who may be willing to treat.90 
If there is a competent body of professional opinion prepared to administer treatment to a 
child, they will be able to locate a clinician prepared to do so. 
 
Throughout the proceedings, Francis J encouraged the parties to resolve their differences so 
they could together agree what was best for Charlie. In his April judgment, the judge expressed 
the opinion that in all such cases an Issues Resolution Hearing or other form of mediation 
would at least enable the parties to explore whether there was any common ground.91  In the 
July hearings, whilst making authoritative rulings Francis J sought to facilitate agreement. The 
judge encouraged the parties to try mediation, facilitated the parties’ agreement to an experts 
meeting chaired by an independent clinical ethicist and attended by Connie Yates, and 
encouraged the parties to explore all options to find end of life care upon which all could agree. 
The judge will not order doctors to treat contrary to their professional conscience but can 
encourage the parties to reach agreement upon the best interests of the child.  
 
Jonathan Montgomery has argued that the judiciary have not been very exacting in 
establishing the standards the law imposes upon medical practice. He suggested that we 
should look instead to the values and standards within the professions set by, for example, 
good practice guidelines.92 The clinicians at GOSH had applied the RCPCH Guidance in 
reaching their conclusion that ventilation should be withdrawn and made reference to their 
duty to put the interests of the child first as stated in GMC guidance.93 Good medical practice 
will also ensure that decisions are subject to proper scrutiny to protect the interests of the 
child.94  The GOSH clinicians had planned to put the question of the administration of the 
                                                 
86  Ibid, [29]. 
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innovative therapy to their Ethics Committee and, where treatment in the US was planned, the 
therapy required US Food and Drug Administration approval for first use in humans. Not all 
cases will end up in court. The parents of Charlie, Ashya and Jaymee are not the only ones 
who have fought for their child to have a chance of innovative therapy. Similarly, cases in 
which parents are agreed with their child’s clinicians that active treatment is no longer in their 
child’s best interests may not be referred to court. Whether before the court or not, the 
standards the law imposes are supplemented by good medical practice which serves to 
protect both practitioner and patient.            
 
Conclusions 
In most cases parents are asked to give their consent to treatment with known therapeutic 
benefits, or to agree to the withholding or withdrawal of active treatment, recommended by 
clinicians in the exercise of their judgement in accordance with a competent body of 
professional opinion. Where disagreements about a child’s medical treatment are brought to 
court and the focus is upon the question of the child’s best interests, it is assumed that the 
treatment option under consideration is proper medical treatment for the child. The case of 
Charlie Gard required explicit assessment of the question whether there was a competent 
body of professional opinion which supported the trial of innovative therapy. With easy access 
to information, of varying degrees of veracity, of possible alternative treatment via the internet 
the viability of alternative therapy is increasingly going to be an issue for debate between 
parents of seriously ill children and their clinicians both seeking to ensure the child receives 
the best possible medical treatment. Concerned as all courts were with the sole question of 
what was in Charlie’s best interests, the judgments of the courts from the Family Division in 
April, through the domestic appeals process, to the European Court of Human Rights and 
back to the High Court in July, do not provide any guidance for those who may in the future 
be faced with a disagreement about what is medically possible. The answer I argue lies in the 
framework set out in Simms: considering professional duties of care in the determination of 
competent and reasonable body of professional opinion, determination of the best interests of 
the child informed by parental knowledge and expertise gained as they care for their child and 
good medical practice guidance and processes to ensure the child is given the best possible 
care but is not exposed to harm by pioneering, novel, or experimental, therapy.   
 
Whilst in July, Charlie’s parents reluctantly agreed that it was no longer in Charlie’s best 
interests to try the therapy and withdrew their opposition to the orders95 they maintained the 
view that had Charlie received the therapy at an earlier point in time it would have made a 
difference. They maintained the view that had they been able to secure what they considered 
to be in their son’s best interests he would have had a chance of a better quality of life. 
Although necessarily speculative, had there been a thorough review of proper medical 
treatment, it is possible that an agreement may have been reached between Charlie’s parents 
and clinicians at an earlier stage.  An earlier agreement would have prevented the distress 
caused to the parents by the lengthy court proceedings in which they no longer were able to 
make decisions about their child’s life. An earlier agreement could have limited the 
deterioration to the parent/professional relationship and the period of time during which the 
clinicians were legally obliged to continue ventilation when they considered this to be 
professionally and ethically wrong. Most significantly, it could have facilitated an earlier 
agreement about the future medical treatment that was best for a seriously ill child by those 
most directly responsible for his welfare.         
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